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Introduction
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the methodology used in empirical analyses of international trade. We attempt to examine one of the principal indicators used in this literature, unit export value (UEV), and in particular its popular use as a measure of the quality of an export product.
UEV is a basic tool that is used in the studies of intra-industry trade (IIT) that seek to divide this kind of trade into vertical and horizontal components (e.g. Greenaway, Hine, Milner 1993 , Fontagné, Freudenberg, Gaulier 2002 . UEV is also frequently used to measure export quality in empirical research into the "export performance" and international "competitiveness" of industries (see Aiginger 2000 , Dullek et al 2005 .
It should be stressed that it is not about the mere correlation between export price (which is the most natural interpretation of UEV) and export quality: the literature quoted above assumes that export quality can be measured by export unit values. As stated by Fontagné, Freudenberg, and Gaulier (2002) , 'differences in prices within one product category mirror differences in quality' (emphasis added). The implications of such assumptions are numerous. For one it becomes possible to distinguish between goods of similar quality and those of different quality by setting a limit on the permitted difference in their UEVs. This is done in the studies on vertical and horizontal IIT. More generally, this assumption makes it possible to draw conclusions from the observed differences in UEVs between industries, countries and over time (for instance Dulleck et al, 2005 , list Central and Eastern European countries that improved quality in the early 1990s and those that failed to do so). Note that these applications would not be possible had UEVs been only a statistical proxy for quality.
Given such strong methodological implications, it would seem worthwhile to consider the viability of UEV as a measure of quality. This, however, is hardly ever done, even if authors are usually aware of the problem. As Fontagné, Freudenberg, Gaulier (2002) say (in a footnote): 'There are numerous reasons leading to slight departures from a strict association of prices with quality. Trade economists are accustomed to this simplification'.
Are trade economists right and is the departure really 'slight'? Lüthje and Nielsen (2002) offer an interesting critique of UEV as a tool for breaking down IIT into vertical and horizontal parts. They analyzed the product-level bilateral trade between France and Germany in 1961-1999 , and for each year, they attributed each product to either inter-industry trade, vertical intra-industry trade or horizontal intra-industry trade. Then they performed run tests to verify if the attribution of goods into categories is stable. Apparently it is not: the hypothesis that the attribution is random cannot be rejected in a vast majority of cases. This result suggests that the use of UEV, at least the way it is done in IIT studies, is doubtful, since it is unlikely that the quality of exported/imported products is so unstable. It is not clear, however, why the empirical method does not work: is the quality measure fundamentally wrong, is there a problem with the definition of vertical and horizontal IIT (cf. Gullstrand 2002 , Azhar and Elliot 2006) , or is there simply a "practical" problem with statistical data (for instance due to aggregation, misallocation of goods into trade categories, and measurement units used to determine quantity)?
This last question cannot be resolved as long as one remains in the realm of trade data, but we would argue that there is a fundamental conceptual problem with UEV as a measure of export product quality. Our critique begins with the observation that prices might not follow quality closely if goods are differentiated not only by quality but also by other factors (e.g. due to horizontal product differentiation). This might benefit some producers allowing for markups higher than those of competitors selling similar quality goods. Even if the demand structure does not give an advantage to any producer, then prices might not follow qualities one-for-one due to consumers' "love of variety". Prices might also reflect international trade costs as stressed in the pricing-to-market literature (see Atkeson and Burnstein 2008) . Note that these costs will differ among the pairs of trading partners. Our empirical results support these reservations. We performed two kinds of tests. First, we analyzed the CES function with products differentiated by quality (cf. Hallak 2004) . We proved that the assumption regarding the strict association between equilibrium price and equilibrium quality implies a rather restrictive condition about import values. We tested this conclusion by analyzing German imports between 1994-2006 and we found that it does not hold true for a vast majority of markets.
Our second test can be potentially applied to a wider class of functions. It is based on a simple demand function estimation according to the following logic. Suppose that quality is the principal differentiation factor and that UEV is the correct way to measure it. Then for a given market, small differences in prices among sellers should not result in substantial changes in quantities sold (because quality is the only non-price decision parameter, and apparently quality has changed only slightly if price has changed only slightly). In other words, we would expect the distribution of E(Q|P) over sellers to be not far from continuous.
Again, we tested this hypothesis for a possible demand function using German imports between 1994-2006 by analyzing the conditional distribution of import quantities on import unit values (over countries of origin). We found that for a majority of goods, this distribution is strongly discontinuous as it has 'thresholds': quantity falls abruptly with an incremental increase in export unit value. Since our analysis controlled for exporters' GDP, population, distance from Germany and participation in a free trade area with the EU, one can argue that such effects as variation in income and international trade costs are already accounted for.
Consequently, the most plausible explanation is that the problem is using UEV as a measure of quality.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical justification for using UEV as a measure of quality. Section III presents an empirical analysis Section IV discusses the results and concludes.
Quality measurement and trade theory
Although UEV is a popular measure of quality, there has not been much economic modeling in support of it. Take the method of breaking down IIT into vertical and horizontal components proposed by Abd-El-Rahman (1986) 1 . While it has been used by several authors, none of them, to the best of our knowledge, has presented a formal model. The same applies to the 'competitiveness' studies mentioned above.
It seems natural to look for appropriate models in the trade theory literature. The approach to modeling quality offered in this literature follows that of Industrial Organization (e.g. Sutton 1983 and 1987; Thisse 1982, Rosen 1974) . In this literature, quality is identified with a parameter that enters the demand function and in most cases (though not all, see below) the costs function. Formally, consider a market in which a product is differentiated. Let varieties (or models) of the product be indexed by Z z ∈ . Usually it is assumed that
are vectors of prices and qualities respectively. Typically it is assumed that:
In some approaches, the quality parameter also enters the cost function of variety z , which is increasing in both arguments:
We can now attempt to express the problem of quality measurement. If price indeed "mirrors" quality, then we would expect that in equilibrium these variables are proportional:
We have thus arrived at a formalized hypothesis (henceforth: 'proportionality hypothesis') that can be investigated both theoretically and empirically. Note that this formulation is very broad; in particular we have made no assumptions about the nature of equilibrium.
Since price and quality are co-determined by supply and demand, the proportionality hypothesis would be guaranteed if both supply and demand functions were linear in both these variables. It is less obvious why (2) would hold in other cases. However some models do make it possible, at least theoretically. Flam and Helpman analyze two-way trade in vertically differentiated products between two countries ("North" and "South"). There is a continuum of varieties ( R Z = ), differentiated by quality only. Producers are identified with varieties. Unit costs are constant in quantity but increasing in quality, i.e.
Where ctr stands for country (North or South). There is also a continuum of consumers, differing in income. In equilibrium, complete specialization takes place: models up to a certain quality are produced only in the South while above that point, quality production takes place only in the North.
The assumption of a continuum of producers, of which each adds little to the market, implies in this kind of model (as shown by Rosen 1974 ) that products in the long run are priced at the minimum average cost, thus at the marginal cost. Hence:
The price is determined by the supply side only. Therefore the proportionality hypothesis could theoretically be true if unit costs were linear in quality. However, the authors assume that ctr Ĉ is a convex function. A similar model which has the same implications about prices is the one by Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) .
By contrast in the discrete-choice model by Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse (1981) , On the other hand, it is clear that even in the two models quoted above, equilibrium prices can be proportional to equilibrium qualities only under certain (rather strong) assumptions 3 .
Moreover, both models rely on a more general (also strong) assumption: that products are differentiated by quality only.
However including horizontal product differentiation in the analysis can alter the results
substantially. We will demonstrate this by referring to an additive discrete choice model (following Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1990) . Consider a population of consumers indexed by W w ∈ , choosing among n varieties of a differentiated good. The choice is made by maximizing the consumer's conditional utility function:
is the utility drawn by the consumer w from the consumption of one unit of
A is the quality of model i , while ) (w F i is the individual valuation of variety i by consumer w and it represents horizontal differentiation of the good.
It is worth stressing that
is indeed the same parameter that we introduced in formula (1). To arrive at (1) requires aggregating the individual decisions of consumers (cf. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1990, pp. 66-70) . In addition we assume that each consumer buys only one unit of the preferred variety.
Note that (3) accounts for both, the vertical and the horizontal aspect of product differentiation. It seems realistic to assume that goods are differentiated in both dimensions, a fact that is somehow overlooked in the empirical literature on international trade, which seems to ignore the fact that some goods, by their very nature, might be difficult to ascribe to either horizontal or vertical IIT, even in theory.
For simplicity's sake we will assume that there are only two sellers and that consumers cannot refrain from buying (there is no outside option). In that case the demand for variety 1 equals the mass of consumers for whom
Now suppose that firms compete in prices with the qualities given and that 2 1 A A > . Even though seller 1 offers a higher quality product, she might not be the one that charges a higher price in the Nash equilibrium if most consumers have a subjective predilection for variety 2, i.e.
. While this particular example might seem artificial, it is intuitive that prices will not follow qualities one-for-one if consumers subjectively prefer certain products over others (even if that does not lead to "reversals" of the kind characterized above).
However the problem with horizontal product differentiation is a more serious one. In fact, even when no variety enjoys the preferential interest of consumers, hypothesis (2) might not hold. Consider the well-known CES demand function:
where E is the total amount spent on the good and 1 0 < < γ . This is a "love of variety" kind of demand function and this property turns out to be particularly relevant in the context of quality measurement. It implies that even if the seller of the worst quality variety chooses to charge the highest price in the market, the product will still remain on the market. This
suggests that measuring quality using prices might be difficult. Indeed, it is easily verified that:
implying that (2) holds if and only if :
In other words, in the CES model, prices and qualities are proportional if and only if all varieties generate exactly the same revenue! This observation gives us an idea of how can the proportionality hypothesis can be tested empirically. Let (4) represent a given country's demand for a differentiated good. Each variety r is either imported or domestically produced. We will assume that in the equilibrium full specialization takes place. Thus each variety is produced by only one country. Following Hallak (2004) and Feenstra (2004) we assume that all models (varieties) produced by one N is the number of varieties imported from country i and i r is any of the varieties imported from that country. Note (6) implies:
for any two countries i and j exporting to the country under consideration (or for one exporting country and the importing country itself).
Consequently assuming the CES demand function, the hypothesis about proportionality of price and quality can be tested using (7). This is done in the next section (for German imports).
The second test we are going to perform can be applied to a wider class of demand functions. Again, consider a differentiated good market in an importing country. Suppose the demand (1) for variety r has the following "symmetry" property
In words, demand for variety r can be expressed as a product of two functions, one of the price and quality of variety r and one of the entire vector ) ( A P, , and of E , which is the country's total expenditure on the differentiated good (to the power of 0 > λ ). About both functions, Q and Q we will assume that they are continuous. The CES function and the multinomial logit model are among the demand functions that have property (7).
Again, under perfect specialization and assuming equal prices and qualities within countries:
where i Q is the quantity imported from country i . Again, suppose that (2) holds. Then:
An implication of (9) is that that small differences in prices among countries should not result in substantial changes in quantities sold. In other words, we would expect the distribution of E(Q|P) over exporting countries to be not far from continuous. This is the hypothesis we will take to data for test. 4 For instance, suppose that
for the remaining ones. 5 It implies, in particular, that the demand function has the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the ration of demands for two varieties depends solely on the prices and qualities of these two models. Competition between varieties in this model is "symmetric": an increase in price (or quality) of a given model increases (reduces) demand for all remaining varieties by the same proportion. No variety is privileged due to horizontal product differentiation. Finally, we needed data on distances between Germany and countries exporting to Germany. We used theglobetrotter.de website to determine distances (in km) between Berlin and the capital of the country in question. In case of some particularly small and remote countries and entities, some simplifying assumptions about GDP, population and distance were made.
Empirical verification of the proportionality hypothesis

Dataset and Sources
Test for the CES demand function
We started by testing the (7) property of the CES function (assuming the proportionality hypothesis). It can be alternatively written:
6 While this dataset was created for administrative purposes, it is convenient inasmuch as it contains a consistent database of ECU/USD exchange rates from the period before fixing of the Euro-zone exchange rates on 31.12.1998. Since InfoEuro rates are calculated on a monthly basis, we take the average over 12 months to obtain the exchange rate in a given year.
(from now on small letters will denote logarithms of variables). In order to check 
Analysis of the continuity of the demand function
Our second test of the proportionality hypothesis (2) is based on the more general equation (9), which, assuming the hypothesis is true, can be written for convenience in terms of functions of prices only:
Q is the amount of imports from country i and Strictly speaking, formula (14) combines two different effects. One is the effect of the size of the country (measured by its GDP and population). The other is the "border effect" of distance and other factors that might influence trade between, in our case, Germany and country i . The "border effect" is usually assumed to influence demand through prices (cf. Feenstra 2004, Ch.5) because it is associated, for instance, with higher shipment costs.
However both approaches lead to the same estimation strategy (at least in our context) so we will stick to our formalization, because it enables us to consider different effects in a concise form.
Taking the logs of (14) and plugging it into (13) we arrive at the model: δ and 2 δ are significantly different from zero, then the imported quantity is best approximated by a function that is discontinuous in price (Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. Discontinuity of the regression function (16)
The procedure for panel data models is more complicated. In this case variables e and where:
U takes on value 1 in year t and 0 in the rest of periods. About error terms we assume that
Model (17) is a so called pooled regression, model (18) . Consequently all the models listed are nonlinear in these parameters. To circumvent this problem, we estimate them recursively using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) , which Amemiya (1984) proved to be convergent.
Next, for each good we choose the appropriate model among models (17)- (19) However we will be able to say more about the relation between import price and quantity.
By testing if parameter β is statistically significant, we can ascribe each good in the database to one of four categories (Table 2) . Table 2 . Classification of goods based on the relation between import price and import quantity. between B and A is that in the latter, a log-linear relationship between price and quantity demanded cannot be established, even within the price "segments". Therefore we labeled it "strong discontinuity". Category A can be further divided into two subgroups:
A1: The segments are "monotonic", i.e. the mean quantity in the price intervals [ ]
is falling.
A2: The segments are nonmonotonic, i.e. the mean quantity is falling at first and then increasing or vice versa Both A1 and B can be regarded as evidence of the nonlinearity of utility and/or unit costs in quality. On the other hand, A2 would indicate a strong and asymmetric horizontal differentiation in the market. Finally, category C includes goods for which the relationship is log-linear throughout the price spectrum, matching our theoretical model (11), contrary to group D, for which all variables are insignificant. Table 3 
Conclusions
In this article, we put measuring export quality by unit export value under scrutiny both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. We formalized the (usually tacit) assumptions that back this method of measuring quality by establishing the 'proportionality hypothesis'. Then we investigated the validity of this hypothesis. We discussed several cases for which the assumption of proportionality between equilibrium prices and equilibrium quality is theoretically doubtful (non-linear utility-and cost functions; strong and asymmetric horizontal product differentiation). We also suggested two methods of verifying the proportionality hypothesis for cases when it cannot be easily rejected theoretically and we applied them to the analysis of German imports between 1994-2006.
The first method is applicable exclusively to the CES demand function and it yielded strong negative results in the case of German imports (i.e. either the demand function was not CES or price and quality were not proportional).
The second method is based on estimating the demand function. It can potentially be applied to a wider range of models in which the competition between varieties of the differentiated good is symmetric. The key idea is to analyze the continuity of the conditional distribution E(Q|P), because if qualities followed prices closely it should be continuous. Again, the test on German data indicated that the distribution is discontinuous for a large majority of goods in all trade sections. Note that we controlled for such factors as exporters' GDP, population and border effects (distance from Germany and EU membership or participation in a free trade area with the EU).
One could question the way we formalized the problem of quality measurement and argue that the proportionality hypothesis is too strong, and that we are "shooting at fish in a barrel".
We would insist, however, that this hypothesis best reflects the logic of empirical literature using UEV as a quality measure. Moreover, only the first of our test ("the CES-test") relied strictly on proportionality of equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities, while the second one ("the continuity test") would remain viable if symbol k in (2) stood not for a constant but for a function of prices, as long as this function was continuous in prices (perhaps with some additional regularity conditions).
Which empirical studies are affected by our critique and which are not? First of all, let us reiterate that the problem we raised applies only to the attempts to measure quality (deterministically) and not to proxy it. On the other hand, our reservations directly address the 'competitiveness' studies, which, just as our tests, are based on the analyses of one-way trade. They also apply indirectly to the IIT studies of two-way trade: if one demand function creates problems with measuring quality by UEV, then two demand functions are likely to be even worse (or just as bad -consider the case of trade between countries with similar endowments).
One implication of our study is that a 1% change in price might indicate a change in quality that is different in market A than in market B. This yields support for the suggestion by Lüthje and Nielsen (2002) to use good-specific dispersion factors when breaking down IIT. On the other hand, our results also indicate that within the same market, a similar change in price might reflect different changes in quality, depending on the exporter.
Having said this, our critique is a methodological one. It does not belittle the importance of competitiveness of industries nor that of inter-industry trade or its decomposition into vertical and horizontal parts (which is relevant, as evidenced by Gullstrand 2002). 
